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Abstract 
 
 
Female philosopher Kym Maclaren, in her article, “Emotional Metamorphoses: The Role of Others in 
Becoming a Subject,” explores a phenomenological view on emotion as being-in-the-world as well as the 
ethical implications of understanding emotion in opposition to the moralistic view. In the first part of this 
paper, I provide an exegetical assessment of Maclaren’s thesis; in the second I introduce a critique of 
Maclaren’s argument and argue a claim of my own which explores perception and autonomy in the human 
body along with its implications in the context of Maclaren’s phenomenological account of emotion. I 
discuss the necessity of both emotion and reason in morality and argue that the traditional definition of 
autonomy is not plausible when considered through Maclaren’s phenomenological view of emotion. 
Finally, I work to creatively explore a new definition of autonomy that does cohere with this view.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
In her article, “Emotional Metamorphoses: The Role of Others in Becoming a Subject,” 
Kym Maclaren explores a phenomenological view of emotion as being-in-the-world as 
well as the ethical implications of understanding emotion in opposition to the 
conventional moralistic view. She introduces three premises: that emotion is “the 
experience of a tension within reality which brings into question our place within 
reality;”1 that expressions of emotion are displays of an individual’s attempts to make 
sense of her reality with the limited existential resources he possesses; and that others 
play an essential role in both the ruling out and lending of existential resources with 
which one can make sense of the world. Maclaren concludes that, “emotion is not 
opposed to reason, but is rather an essential element of our rational development toward 
                                                          
1 Kym Maclaren, “Emotional Metamorphoses: The Role of Other in Becoming a Subject,” 
Embodiment and Agency eds. Sue Campbell, Meynell and Sherwin (University Park: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009), 42. 
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autonomous ways of being.”2 She ultimately proposes that the moralistic attitude is 
fundamentally dismissive of other’s emotional struggles and may therefore prove 
harmful to the development of an individual as a subject. This discussion serves to 
persuade readers into considering a phenomenological view of emotion, particularly in 
the treatment of other’s expressions of emotion. In the first part of this essay, I provide 
an exegetical assessment of Maclaren’s thesis; in the second I introduce a critique of 
Maclaren’s argument and argue a claim of my own which explores perception and 
autonomy in the human body along with its implications in the context of Maclaren’s 
phenomenological account of emotion. I discuss the necessity of both emotion and 
reason in morality and argue that the traditional definition of autonomy is not plausible 
when considered through Maclaren’s phenomenological view of emotion. 
 
 
I. 
           
Maclaren introduces the phenomenological notion of emotion as “being in the world” 
by first exploring the Heideggeran term “Befindlichkeit.” She offers the translation of 
“how one finds oneself situated within the world.”3   
 
This is in contrast to the Cartesian conception of the subject, where the notions of 
knowing and judging relate the subject to her world. In this view, the individual situates 
herself as separate from the world; the synthesis of her judgments of the world and 
understanding of herself lies in her subjective interpretation of the relationship between 
them. An individual is thought to come to this interpretation through internal reflection. 
The interpretation and classification of subject and object implies a dichotomy between 
the experiencer and the experienced; subsequently, the subject’s integration into her 
world is purely internal. The emotions she experiences, similarly, are purely internal. 
With regard to this view, emotions are products of reflection; the individual then 
projects these emotions upon her world.  
 
Maclaren instead explores a phenomenological view of emotion, where the dichotomy 
between subject and object does not exist. This view acknowledges a complete 
integration of the subject within her world and therefore cannot claim that emotion 
stems purely from within the subject; neither is emotion found exclusively in itself in 
the world. Rather, emotion lies in the relationship between the internal representation 
and the external presentation of the world. External factors play the same role in the 
development of emotion as internal factors do. This relationship provides 
phenomenologists with an explanation of emotion that leaves the subject and her world 
inseparable. The concept of pre-reflective thought further supports the understanding of 
the singularity of subject and world. Maclaren acknowledges a “radical reflection,” 
                                                          
2 Maclaren, 26. 
3 Maclaren, 29. 
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through which an individual perceives or interprets her own consciousness and reality 
as it exists pre-reflectively.  Maclaren, in explaining this pre-reflective being, makes the 
claim that “pre-reflectively, [individuals] are not subjects thinking about a world 
beyond us, judging its meaning or essential being, and actively choosing how to act; 
[they] are, rather, beings perceptually caught up in, and moved by, an immediately 
meaningful world.”4 
 
Maclaren discusses the concept of bodily intentionality and explains the significance of 
pre-reflective perception and action. She begins with an explanation of the Cartesian 
concept of mind-body dualism, in which the body is a mechanical vehicle controlled by a 
separate, ruling consciousness. Phenomenologists, she explains, understand the mind and 
body existing rather as one entity that is caught up in and actively coherent with the 
reality that surrounds it. Phenomenologists not only oppose a distinction between the 
mind and the body, but also between the subject and her world. Maclaren introduces the 
term bodily intentionality as pre-reflective “engagement with and thoughts about the 
world,”5 claiming that this bodily intentionality is “evident in the precision and 
attunement of our habitual responsiveness to the world.”6 She draws on an example of an 
experienced typist to illustrate bodily intentionality. In this example, she explains that in 
typing a paper, the experienced typist is not concerned with the organization of the letters 
on her keyboard, but rather with the meaning behind the words she is creating. Maclaren 
describes that, while the experienced typist may be able to type up words without concern 
for letter placement on her keyboard, she is unable to place every letter in its proper place 
on the keyboard if later prompted. Maclaren concludes that this example illustrates that 
her hands know better than her own mind, calling to attention a kind of “knowledge in 
the hands” that is present without conscious acknowledgement. Maclaren argues that 
these apparent reflexes do not, however, imply mechanical, conditioned responses; if the 
experienced typist is given a smaller keyboard, where the letters are separated by very 
different distances than to what the typist is accustomed, the typist “very quickly finds 
[her] way around it [and] needs not take the time to recondition all the movements”7 
necessary to type. Maclaren claims that this subsequent example proves that “the human 
body is not a machine guided by the mind or constituted by reflexes, but an active 
sensitivity oriented toward the potential for meaning in its world, and moved to bring this 
meaning out.”8 In other words, the mind-body dualism cannot possibly explain the 
phenomenon of the accuracy in which the subject can navigate her world. Rather than a 
body, a subject possesses an “active sensitivity” with which she may seamlessly 
communicate with her worldly surroundings.   
 
                                                          
4 Maclaren, 27. 
5 Maclaren, 29. 
6 Maclaren, 30. 
7-8 Maclaren, 30. 
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These surroundings, in Maclaren’s following point, include other subjects as well. This 
orientation of the subject toward meaning in her world allows for the perception of 
other perceiving subjects and, as a result, the possibility of the confirmation of a shared 
reality. Should an individual have to judge or infer what another subject was 
perceiving, she would almost never be sure if she were a part of a shared reality with 
those she encountered, unless she were provided with linguistic confirmation of her 
inference. Maclaren explains that, “in seeing the other’s seeing, however, our inherence 
in a shared reality is immediately confirmed.”9 
 
Consequently, others play a significant role in the introduction of emotional tensions in 
an individual’s world. It is in the exploration of this concept that Maclaren arrives at 
her first premise: that emotion is the experience of tension within reality which brings 
into question our place within reality. External factors cause this tension; the subject 
experiences these factors pre-reflectively. Maclaren considers an example in which a 
young girl is with her uncle in a social setting when her uncle tells a racist joke.10 The 
girl is comfortable in her situation and has been enjoying herself at a family gathering 
until her uncle begins to make racist remarks. The girl has a friend who is of the race 
that is targeted by her uncle’s joke. The girl is uncertain of her next move; should she 
laugh at her uncle’s joke or interrupt to defend her friend? An existential crisis then 
develops which calls into question the girl’s place within her reality: is she her uncle’s 
niece, or her friend’s friend? The girl is now subject to conflicting perceptions of 
herself within her reality; her emotion is dependent not only on her already developed 
feelings regarding her uncle, friend, and the joke, but also on her definition of herself. 
Her actions are a product of the coherence of her self-perception; this product is denied 
when her place within reality is called into question. The significance of this example 
lies in the fact that the expression of emotion (whether to laugh or become upset) is 
dependent on the relationship between her own self-perception and the situation in 
which she finds herself; it is neither purely internal nor purely external. 
 
This analysis quickly leads Maclaren to her next premise: that expressions of emotion are 
displays of an individual’s attempts at making sense of her reality with the limited 
existential resources she possesses. Maclaren explores the moralistic standpoint, which 
understands expressions of emotion as “irrational,” implying that the subject expressing 
emotion is aware of a more rational understanding of her situation and is indulging in 
emotion simply for the sake of doing so. Maclaren references the studies on child 
jealousy conducted by Francoise Dolto-Marette. Maclaren explores the example of a 
child named Gricha, who is jealous of the attention his baby sister receives. Upon 
recognizing that parental attention has been split with the introduction of a new sibling, 
he immediately regresses to a baby-like state: he cannot seem to control his excretions 
and retards in his potential for linguistic expression. Maclaren argues that, rather than an 
                                                          
9 Maclaren, 32. 
10 Maclaren, 33. 
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irrational outburst of baby-like emotion, Gricha is experiencing an existential crisis in 
which he feels hopelessly out of place in his reality. Having previously been the baby, he 
attempts to regress to that familiar state in order to reassert his previous role in reality. 
 
Maclaren transitions to an exploration of her final premise: that others play a significant 
role in the ruling out and lending of existential resources with which an individual may 
make sense of her place within reality. Maclaren writes that the moralistic 
understanding cannot account for the fact that a “child, when offered a better way of 
assuming [a] situation, happily takes this up, and is momentarily liberated from his 
jealousy.”11 She describes how Gricha’s nanny tells Gricha that his little sister is proud 
to have such a strong big brother, providing Gricha with the necessary existential 
resources for making sense of his world. He becomes an older brother by referencing 
the only older brother he knows—his own!   
 
His older brother, however, is unhappy with Gricha’s newfound habits, and demands that 
Gricha stop copying him. Gricha is thrown once again into an existential crisis and no 
longer feels he has a place within his reality. However, he is provided with a new set of 
resources when he experiences his older brother acting as a middle child when they go 
out to play with other children. This experience provides him with the resources that 
allow him to understand his new place in the family as the middle child. Gricha is no 
longer the youngest, nor can he be the oldest. Gricha hereby sacrifices his “lived logic”: 
he previously defined himself according to a logic of absolutes, and now defines himself 
by a logic of relativity. He is younger relative to his oldest brother and older relative to 
his youngest brother. He acquires a new role and his existential crises has passed. 
 
Maclaren thereby arrives at her conclusion that emotion is not opposed to reason, but is 
rather an essential element in the construction of a rational understanding of one’s place 
in the world. Through the phenomenological view of emotion as being-in-the-world, 
one draws the understanding that emotion is the experience of tension within an 
individual’s reality and is comprised of both internal and external components. The 
expression of emotion is neither irrational nor uncalled-for. Emotional expression 
represents the struggle to develop and maintain coherence of the understanding of the 
self within one’s environment and the presentation of that environment. Factors within 
the environment include other subjects; these subjects have an effect on an individual 
and may therefore either provide, challenge, or deny existential resources with which 
one can make sense of one’s place within the world. 
 
Finally, Maclaren describes the ethical implications of subscribing to the moralistic 
interpretation of emotion. Treating emotion as irrational and superfluous may deny an 
individual crucial existential resources needed in the development of herself as a 
subject, and may even drive her to “madness.” Maclaren explains that the moralistic 
                                                          
11 Maclaren, 34. 
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interpretation “neglects both the validity of a person’s expressions and the necessity, in 
a human life, of learning, or developing through inter-subjective encounters, better 
resources for making sense of ourselves and our world.”12  It is therefore imperative 
that one interprets emotion as an attempt at rational understanding of the relationship 
between subject and world, and that one understands the potential for harm in not 
acknowledging emotion as such. 
 
 
II.          
 
Maclaren concludes that emotion is “an essential element of our rational development 
toward autonomous ways of being.”13 In part II of this paper I break this conclusion 
down into three smaller, distinct claims: that the subject is not inherently rational, but 
rather possesses the potential for rational development; that this rational development 
leads towards autonomous ways of being; and that emotion is an absolutely necessary 
factor in rational development and is therefore necessary to autonomy. In the following 
paragraphs I examine each of these claims in an attempt to disprove them and to argue 
my own claim that emotion is not necessary in autonomous ways of being, but rather is 
an absolutely necessary element in moral development toward ethical ways of being. 
 
The first of these three claims by Maclaren, as mentioned, states that the subject is not 
inherently rational, but rather possesses potential for rational development. In other 
words, human beings are not born naturally rational, but develop rationally instead. 
They are born with solely the potential to reason and not reason itself. This statement, I 
believe, does the human race a disservice. I argue that both humans and even animals 
are inherently able to reason and do so from the start of their lives; they must reason in 
order to survive. Acting rationally is adhering to a code of conduct and acting in a 
specific and predictable manner. Animals must act according to a basic, biological code 
of survival: stay alive, propagate. Though simplistic, all living creatures are born 
subjected to this biological law. In following this biological law an animal thusly acts 
rationally, this is evident from the understanding that it is irrational of an animal to 
commit self-harm or suicide. Reason is not unique to the developed or mature human 
being, it is present across the broad spectrum of living things. Though mature humans 
subject themselves to much more complicated codes of conduct and may be aware of 
reason, this does not make other human beings/animals less rational or irrational. It is 
therefore folly to conclude that the subject is not inherently rational. Instead, I propose 
that the subject is both inherently rational and retains the capacity to develop both 
awareness and complexity of reason. 
 
                                                          
12 Maclaren, 43. 
13 Maclaren, 26. 
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The second claim I have identified in Maclaren’s conclusion states that rational 
development leads to autonomous ways of being. I will here examine the latter part of 
the claim, as I have already discussed the former. Maclaren’s claim that “autonomous 
ways of being” are even possible contradicts her description of emotion and integration. 
Maclaren describes emotion as being-in-the-world, illustrating that emotion can be 
understood as the relationship between how a subject is situated within the world and 
how the world presents itself to the subject. Her article is an attempt to persuade readers 
into considering the significance in the treatment of others with regard to emotion, and 
stresses the apparently external sites of existential resources within others. The subject 
is then, seemingly, completely dependent upon others and her environment in order to 
develop rationally. Phenomenologists argue for the dissipation of absolutes such as 
mind/body (as Maclaren explicitly argues) and subject/reality (as implied in Maclaren’s 
explanation of emotion existing as a relationship). Through the phenomenological 
understanding, there cannot be autonomy, but only the complete integration of the 
subject within her reality at any given moment. The concept of autonomy “is in fact an 
artificial product of philosophical reflection.” As Maclaren herself writes, “we are not 
subjects … actively choosing how to act; we are, rather, beings perceptually caught up 
in … an immediately meaningful world.”14 This claim and Maclaren’s use of the word 
autonomy cannot be supported by her argument.   
 
Maclaren may, however, be asking the reader to redefine autonomy. In following the 
traditional view of autonomy one is by definition subscribing to the Cartesian 
understanding of subject as separate from the world—the subject processes information 
given by the world and then chooses how to act on this information. It is this processing 
of information that Maclaren would define as interpretation or reflection. Maclaren 
describes pre-reflective thought as the experience as being immediately caught up in 
and moved by the world; she later explains that the individual’s body, rather than being 
a mechanical instrument of will, is instead a vessel oriented toward and defined by 
meaning in the world. As previously discussed, autonomy is not possible in this 
understanding. However, Maclaren may be implying that autonomy, rather than 
residing in post-interpretive action, lies in pre-reflective experience. This pre-reflective 
thought is without bias or other influence; it is the rawest form of cognition and 
therefore the most accurate representation of the individual’s thought. Pre-reflective 
thought may serve as the new home for autonomous action, as any decision subject to 
reflection is by definition subject to bias. It may prove prudent to reconsider the 
definition of autonomy in order to gain a more accurate understanding of the subject’s 
undeniable relationship with her world. This reorientation sheds new light on the 
conception of the individual and facilitates the understanding of emotion as 
existentially significant, providing further reason to regard emotional expressions as 
something more than irrational outbursts. 
 
                                                          
14 Maclaren, 27. 
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The third claim I have derived from Maclaren’s conclusion is the one that carries the 
most weight: that emotion is absolutely necessary in rational development and is 
therefore necessary to autonomy. As per earlier discussion, the subject is inherently 
rational and autonomy is not possible considering the phenomenological view on 
emotion. However, I argue a claim that is similar though not the same:  that emotion is 
absolutely necessary in moral development and therefore necessary to ethical ways of 
being. Moral development, because it is influenced by emotion, is subject to the 
reconstructed definition as discussed in the preceding paragraph.   
 
Morality is solely a human construct. All animals act rationally, but they do so without 
regard for morality whatsoever. Animals, therefore, act neither morally nor immorally; 
all actions performed by animals are amoral actions. Humans, on the other hand, are 
subject to emotion; it is the experience of emotion which defines whether a creature can 
act morally.  Human beings can experience empathy and cannot therefore act 
amorally.15 This conclusion ties emotion and morality closely together. However, 
acting purely on emotion cannot be consistently moral, for this brings into the picture a 
relativistic approach: different people experience different emotions, i.e. different 
things make different people happy, upset, hurt, etc. How then can emotion define the 
potential for moral action? Reason must be incorporated. Emotions are universal 
enough to dictate an ethical code, however they are not precise. Morality is the 
application of reason on emotion; emotion and reason are inseparable with regard to 
emotion. I thereby conclude that emotion is absolutely necessary in moral development 
and therefore necessary to ethical conduct. 
 
Maclaren offers an insightful phenomenological understanding of emotion in her 
article. However, it remains imperative that further research be conducted in order to 
further understand emotion and to be able to move forward in new productive ways of 
thought. In understanding emotion and its role in the development of the individual as 
subject, one may engage in more appropriate and positive interactions with others and 
with her world. As implied here, interdisciplinary work between philosophy and the 
sciences may prove indispensable in the exploration of emotion, autonomy, and ethical 
ways of being. 
 
                                                          
15 There are of course exceptions to this rule: there exist cognitive defects that may impair a 
human being from feeling empathetic, as in the case of a sociopathic individual. Individuals who 
cannot experience a sense of commiseration are exempt from morality and therefore can act only 
amorally, as animals do. The opposite is also true: some animals possess a rudimentary limbic 
system and so too can experience some emotion (e.g. dolphins, elephants). The actions of these 
animals therefore cannot be amoral actions. 
